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INTRODUCTION

Among the abuses of the crown that culminated in the English Civil War of the 1640s was the oath ex officio, which required
the subject to answer whatever questions were propounded by
the royal inquisitor. Through the oath, the subject could be compelled to accuse himself and provide the evidence for conviction.
Consequently, the oath was often abused: enemies of the Crown
and the Church of England were easy prey in a world where false
swearing meant eternal damnation.'
The privilege against self-incrimination is an invention of the
English common law. After 1641, the common law - with its
accusatorial process and privilege against self-incrimination prevailed. The fundamental value judgment embodied in the
common law privilege - that the dangers of executive abuse outweigh the evidentiary gain obtained through compelled testimony - was a hard lesson learned from the inquisitorial Star
Chamber and the Court of High Commission.2
Although the privilege became a first principle of English
liberty, royal governors in America employed abusive tactics, including the oath, against those suspected of seditious libel. 3
Memories of these abuses undoubtedly motivated the inclusion
of the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. . .. "'

The privilege against self-incrimination, however, is not
without costs. Testimony from the accused and co-conspirators,
for example, is generally unavailable.5 Plainly, the inability to obtain such testimony can harm law enforcement efforts.6
I Harold W. Wolfram,John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillarof Fire, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV.

213, 219 (1952).

2 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 278-82 (McNaughton rev. 1961 &
Supp. 1991).
3 R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 783-85 (1935).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 The privilege, of course, can be waived. As former New Jersey Supreme

Court ChiefJustice Weintraub once explained, law enforcement is dependent, to a
large degree, on ill-advised self-incrimination:
[A]s to the culprit who reveals his guilt unwittingly with no intent to
shed his inner burden, it is no more unfair to use the evidence he
thereby reveals than it is to turn against him clues at the scene of the

crime which a brighter, better informed, or more gifted criminal
would not have left.
State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968).

6 The development of immunity law parallels that of the privilege and serves to
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Until 1970, the only methods of overcoming the Fifth
Amendment privilege were either to secure the voluntary cooperation of the suspect or to supplant the privilege through a
grant of absolute immunity from subsequent prosecution. 7 The
relatively recent approval of "use and derivative use" immunity
means that the government no longer must provide absolute immunity to the witness whose testimony it has compelled. Instead,
testimony can now be required as long as the witness remains
substantially in the same position as if he had remained silent.8
Although the United States Supreme Court approved of use
and derivative use immunity in Kastigar v. United States,9 it pro-

vided lower courts with almost no guidance in implementation.
In particular, the Kastigar Court did not address the difficulties
that lower courts would encounter in determining whether immunized testimony played a prohibited role in any given
prosecution, 10

This Article examines whether the "inevitable discovery" exception should be applied when government investigators and
witnesses are exposed to immunized materials. In United States v.
Streck," the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the doctrine
and affirmed the defendant's conviction even though witnesses
and government investigators had been exposed to the substance
of the defendant's immunized statements. The Alaska Court of
Appeals eschewed this approach in Hazelwood v. Alaska. 2 There
the court concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine - derived from the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule - is
mitigate its adverse impact on law enforcement. Rita Werner Gordon, Right to Immunity For Defense Witnesses, 20 CONN. L. REV. 153, 157 (1987); WIGMORE, supra note
2, § 2281, at 491; Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the ConstitutionalTightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571 (1963).
7 Prosecutors rarely granted absolute immunity because the price - essentially
a pardon - was too high. David Sugar, Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practices
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 278 (1976).
8 The new, lower price has generated a profound effect. Specifically, prosecutors have enthusiastically compelled testimony in exchange for use and derivative
use immunity. In fact, a study by the National Lawyers Guild concluded that more
witnesses were granted such immunity within the first ten months of the enactment
of the federal use and derivative use statute than in the preceding fifty years of

transactional immunity.

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES
BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES: A MANUAL FOR ATrORNEYS 13-52 (1974).

9 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
10 E.R. Harding, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: PracticalProblems in
the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV. 470, 477-89 (1974).
11 958 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1992)
12 836 P.2d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
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inapplicable in the immunity context. 13
This Article concludes that the deterrent rationale should
not apply to immunized testimony because such evidence is not
unlawfully obtained. Moreover, because immunized testimony
alters the course of events in unknowable ways, the inevitable discovery doctrine's inherent uncertainty produces a genuine risk of
improper application. Further, inevitable discovery effectively
permits the government to renege on its obligations, arising
from a conscious decision to force an individual to incriminate
himself. Consequently, this Article concludes that the road taken
by the Hazelwood court is preferable to that pursued in Streck.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMUNITY STATUTES

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

As noted, the historic origin of the Fifth Amendment can be
traced to the struggle between the common law and an inquisitorial system derived from canon law and characterized by the oath
ex officio.' 4 Originally, the oath ex officio was a technique that the
Church employed to combat heresy throughout Christendom in
the thirteenth century. 15 The suspected heretic would be
brought before inquisitors, placed under the oath and forced to
reveal "secret thoughts or private doubts that might constitute
heresy."' 6 The oaths were quite effective because a false oath17
before God would subject a true believer to an eternity in hell.
Some preferred being subjected to earthly punishment, which
could include being burned at the stake.' 8
The Crown eventually adopted the oath as a tool to eliminate dissent.' 9 The Court of the Star Chamber began using the
oath in the sixteenth century, often targeting political enemies.20
At this time, the royal Court of High Commission also used the
13 Id. at 953.
14 See generally, LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 43-82
(1968).
15 Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, The Privilege Against Compelled Self-

Incrimination, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 249, 253-54 (1990).
16 Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
17 Id.

18 Id.
19 The historical connection between the privilege against self-incrimination and

the abolition of torture is disputed. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1077-79 (1986). It
should be noted that use of the oath remained commonplace long after the use of
torture had become quite rare. Id.
20 LEVY, supra note 14, at 182-84.
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oath to eradicate religious dissent. 2 ' In these inquisitorial courts,
all judicial functions were combined in one office. The inquisitor
would bring the subject to court, require self-accusation and then
determine the individual's guilt or innocence. Consequently,
many questionable verdicts were reached in inquisitorial
courts .22

In the common law, however, England had developed an alternative, rival legal system. The fundamental characteristics of
that system are familiar: a grand jury performed the charging
function and determined who would be brought before the court
for criminal prosecution, a crown prosecutor marshalled the evidence against the suspect, a judge presided over the trial and a
petit jury decided the suspect's ultimate fate.23 Unlike the inquisitorial system, the common law placed the burden of bringing
charges and the burden of proof on the Crown. 24 Likewise, the
inquisitorial system fragmented the Crown's functions, thereby
avoiding the aggregation of judicial power in one office.
The Civil War of the 1640s ultimately decided which legal
system -

the inquisitorial or common law -

would prevail in

England. The royalists aligned with the inquisitorial system and
the use of the oath ex officio. The Parliamentarians chose the common law. Because the Parliamentarians prevailed, they abolished
the oath in 1641.25 As a result, the oath ex officio was ousted and
replaced by the common law principle that "no man shall be re26
quired to accuse himself."

In the American colonies, the victory of the common law was
not yet so complete. Several royal colonial governors used oaths
Id. at 130-33, 182-83.
The trials of "Freeborn John" Lilburne brought publicity concerning royal
abuse of the oath to the forefront of English public opinion. WIGMORE, supra note
2, § 2250, at 283, 289. Lilburne's efforts and punishment (a public whipping) for
refusing to testify against himself are considered to have been major catalysts in the
demise of the Star Chamber and of the oath. Id. at 289.
23 G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 67-68 (5th
ed. 197 1).
24 E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1949).
25 To be precise, the oath was abolished in ecclesiastical courts. LEVY, supra note
14, at 281-82. The Act for Abolition of the Court of High Commission of July 5,
1641 expressly prohibited ecclesiastical courts from requiring any person " 'to confess or to accuse him or herself of any crime, offence, delinquency or misdemeanour, or any neglect or thing whereby, or by reason whereof, he or she shall or may
be liable or exposed to any censure, pain, penalty or punishment whatsoever.' " Id.
at 282 (quoting 16 Car. 1, ch. 11,§ 4).
26 See LEVY, supra note 14, at 266-300.
21
22

972

SE TON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:967

and engaged in other abusive practices.2 7 Colonial legislatures
adopted the privilege in response to such executive abuse.28
These royal abuses undoubtedly were known to the members of
the First Congress that adopted the Fifth Amendment in 1791.
American fundamental law was now in accord with its English
counterpart.

B.

Immunity

The privilege carries societal costs because it deprives public
authorities of evidence that the accusatorial, adversarial system
must possess to convict the criminal. The common law system
requires the government to marshal and present evidence and to
bear the burden of proof. Often, however, the "best" witnesses
will be the accused and co-conspirators. Because both the defendant and co-conspirators can invoke the privilege and be unavailable, the privilege against self-incrimination renders some
crimes difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute in the absence of a
method to supplant the privilege. Consequently, varieties of
common law immunity are nearly as old as the privilege itself.2 9
In the early nineteenth century, the lack of organized police
forces also contributed to the difficulty in prosecuting
criminals.3 0 Accordingly, prosecuting authorities of the day, like
their modern counterparts, often "immunized" accomplices by
promising pardons in exchange for testimony. The Supreme
Court's Whiskey Cases' decision provides a description of the
practice:
Prosecutors... should explain to the accomplice that he is not
obliged to [in]criminate himself, and inform him just what he
may reasonably expect in case he acts in good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as to his own acts in the case, and those of
his associates. When he fulfills those conditions he is equitably entitled to a pardon, and the prosecutor, and the court if
See Pittman, supra note 3, at 786-87 (citing examples of abusive practices).
Eventually, forty-eight states adopted a privilege against self-incrimination in
their state constitutions. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2252, at 319. Iowa recognizes
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination through case law. See, e.g.,
Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Iowa 1991). NewJersey recognizes the privilege statutorily. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-19 (West 1992).
29 The earliest variety of common law immunity, approvement, was a practice
"under which a person arraigned for a felony might accuse another as his accomplice and become entitled to a pardon if the accused accomplice were convicted."
Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7
(1992). By the eighteenth century, approvement fell into disuse. Id.
30 Id.
31 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
27
28
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need be, when fully
informed of the facts, will join in such a
32
recommendation.
Significantly, however, these immunity agreements were consensual
in nature. In other words, the witness bargained away the privilege
in exchange for leniency or a pardon.
There is nothing voluntary about testimony pursuant to an immunity statute. Rather, the witness is compelled to testify in exchange for statutorily-determined benefits. The first federal
statute, 33 enacted in 1857, granted transactional immunity to witnesses who testified before congressional subcommittees .34 Transactional immunity forever bars prosecution of a witness for crimes
revealed during compelled testimony and, consequently, can be
quite beneficial to a witness. Given these substantial benefits, the
absence of any procedural controls limiting who was to testify and
the self-executing nature of the grant of immunity, many formerly
reluctant witnesses came forward.
Abuse of the 1857 statute through so-called "immunity
baths"' 35 led to an 1862 amendment 36 that narrowed the scope of
protection to prohibiting only the actual use of the testimony in any
future prosecution. 3 7 The 1862 Act created a limited type of immunity, "simple use" immunity, which did not preclude derivative use
of the immunized testimony. Thus, even though the immunized testimony could not be directly used, it could be used to locate new
sources of evidence, which in turn could be employed to convict the
witness.
i.

Transactional Immunity

Simple use immunity statutes are not co-extensive with the
Fifth Amendment privilege. In the 1892 case of Counselman v.
Hitchcock,38 the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of these types of immunity statutes.3 9 Significantly, the Court
Id. at 604.
Act ofJan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155-56 (1857).
34 George Dorian Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment
Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 327, 333 (1966)
(describing historical background of the 1857 legislation).
35 Id. at 333-35; Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity
Statutes, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 447, 450-54 (1954).
36 Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862).
37 See id.
38 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
39 The statute at issue in Counselman was an 1887 act that extended simple use
immunity to testimony given before the Interstate Commerce Commission. See Act
of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 383 (1887). Previously, simple use immunity had
32
33
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appeared to approve of the underlying theory behind immunity
that removing the threat of criminality arising from compelled
disclosure enables the government to compel a witness to testify. 40 In other words, the Fifth Amendment could be supplanted
by a grant of statutory immunity "as broad as the mischief
against
4
which it [the Fifth Amendment] seeks to guard." '
Simple use statutes fail this test. Under such statutes, compelled testimony can be used to develop a case against the witness through third parties. The potential, indirect use of the
-

compelled testimony

-

the so-called derivative use -

would not

leave the witness in the same position as if he had remained silent. 42 The evidence discovered as a result of compelled disclosure could make the case literally from the witness's own words.
The Counselman Court, therefore, unanimously held that simple use statutes violate the privilege against self-incrimination.43
The Court, however, said more. In particular, the Court stated
that a valid immunity statute must provide transactional immunity to survive Fifth Amendment scrutiny: "In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to
which the question relates.

' 44

Whether this statement consti-

tuted dicta has been the subject of much debate.45 Nevertheless,
Congress viewed the Court's language as a directive and
promptly introduced legislation 46 that would provide transacbeen made available in all federal judicial proceedings. See Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch.
13, 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
40 Counselman, 142 U.S. at 565.
41 Id. at 562. The Court also stated that no grant of immunity could supplant
the privilege "unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect."
Id. at 585.
42 Indeed, the Counselman Court noted that simple use immunity "could not, and
would not, prevent the use of [a witness's] testimony to search out other testimony
to be used ...

against him ....

It could not prevent the obtaining and the use of

witnesses and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he
might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been convicted."
Id. at 564.
43 Id. at 586.
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., Roald Mykkeltvedt, Ratio Decidendi or Obiter Dicta?: The Supreme Court
and Modes of Precedent Transformation, 15 GA. L. REV. 311, 328-29 (1981); Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 174
(1972).
46 A new bill was introduced on January 23, 1892. See 23 CONG. REc. 573
(1892). Counselman was published on January 11, 1892.
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tional immunity in exchange for compelled testimony.4 7
In 1896, the Supreme Court upheld transactional immunity
by a five-to-four vote in Brown v. Walker. 48 In particular, the majority opinion traced the historical origin of the privilege against
self-incrimination and found that transactional immunity statutes
would vindicate the privilege's core purposes, even though the
testimony could subject the witness to social sanctions. 49 The
majority wrote:
The safety and welfare of an entire community should not be
put into the scale against the reputation of a self-confessed
criminal, who ought not, either injustice or in good morals, to
refuse to disclose that which may be of great public utility, in
order that his neighbors may think well of him. The design of
the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect him against being compelled
to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge.5 °
Transactional immunity remained an apparently settled constitutional rule for the next half-century. Congress enacted numerous
federal statutes, all based on transactional immunity.5 ' Indeed, in
United States v. Ullmann,5" the Court seemed to have placed the question beyond dispute: "Since [1896] the Court's holding in Brown v.
Walker has never been challenged; the case and the doctrine it an47 Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (1893). The term "transactional
immunity" arises from the language of the statutes, which typically bar the government from prosecuting the immunized witness for "any transaction, matter or
thing" to which the witness testified. See, e.g., id. at 444.
48 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
49 See generally id. at 594-604.
50 Id. at 605-06. The majority also pragmatically noted that new economic regulations would be impossible to enforce without some sort of immunity statute. See
id. at 610 ("[Tlhe enforcement of the interstate commerce law or other analogous
acts, wherein it is for the interest of both parties to conceal their misdoings, would
become impossible.").
In an unusually forceful dissent, Justice Field emphasized the fair balance between the state and the individual and, quoting Brown's counsel, specifically noted
that the privilege was the " 'result of a long struggle between the opposing forces
of the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand and the collective power of the
State on the other.' " Id. at 637 (Field, J., dissenting).
51 Between 1893 and 1970, Congress enacted over fifty such statutes, all granting transactional immunity to the compelled witness. LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST
THE LAw: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 176 (1974). The legislative
history to the 1970 immunity statute contains a comprehensive list of the transactional immunity statutes that were thereby repealed. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 42-46 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S'.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4019-22; see
also Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1948) (setting forth an abridged list
of federal statutes containing transactional immunity provisions).
52 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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nounced have consistently and without question been treated as definitive by this Court ....The 1893 statute has become part of our
constitutional fabric ....
The Ullmann Court's enshrinement of
transactional immunity, however, proved to be premature.
ii.

Use and Derivative Use Immunity

In the 1964 case of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor,5 4 the Supreme Court reexamined the question of
how much immunity is constitutionally sufficient in an interjurisdictional case. 5 5 In Murphy, state authorities granted a witness
transactional immunity and the witness disclosed his involvement
in crimes that were federal offenses.5 6 Thereafter, federal prosecutors indicted the witness for federal crimes described in that
testimony.
The Supreme Court found that the prosecution could proceed if the government demonstrated the absence of taint from
its evidence: "Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the
federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of
showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that
they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence."5 7 In this passage, Murphy signalled possible judicial approval of immunity statutes narrower than transactional
immunity, but broader than use immunity.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White expressed the belief
that absolute immunity is not required to supplant the Fifth
53

Id. at 437-38.

54 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
55 See id. at 53. Under existing case law, testimony compelled by the state was

generally admissible at a federal trial due to the Supremacy Clause. Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490-91 (1944). Previous "solutions" to the problem
created by the co-existence of federal and state governments, i.e., two sovereignties, were unfair to compelled witnesses and not conducive to national-state comity.
See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-57.
56 Id. at 53-54. The other "two sovereignties" problem, arising when federal
authorities compelled testimony that would be useful in a state prosecution, involved a similarly unfair solution: the state was permitted to use the testimony.
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Indeed, until Murphy's companion
case, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the privilege against self-incrimination
had not been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and had not been
applied in state proceedings.
57 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 n. 18. The Court also concluded that federal authorities could not use "compelled [state] testimony and its fruits" against a state witness. Id. at 79. In other words, the Court crafted a symmetrical solution to the
"two sovereignties" problem.
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Amendment privilege.58 The concurrence noted that in illegal
search and seizure cases and coerced confession cases, the government is still free to prosecute provided it can show that the
"testimony or other evidence is [not] a fruit of the unlawfully obtained evidence. . . -"59 Because the government
is free to prosecute despite "illegal or unconstitutional conduct," it necessarily
follows that in immunity cases where the government can "show
that its evidence is not tainted by establishing that it had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence," the
case should be permitted to proceed.6"
This so-called use and derivative use immunity is conceptually simple. 6 It also seems to offer the best of both worlds to
the prosecutorial authorities: the witness can be compelled to
testify and prosecuted as well. The witness would no longer receive the windfall of transactional immunity, but instead would
be protected from the consequences of his testimony, thereby
leaving him in the same position as if he had remained silent.
The difficulty - for the courts, the prosecutor and the reluctant
witness - is the proof required to show that there was no derivative use of the compelled testimony. In Murphy, the chosen solution was the independent source doctrine, 62 derived from
exclusionary rule jurisprudence.63
58 Id. at 92-107 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stewart joined Justice White's
concurrence. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, concurred in the judgment in
a separate opinion.
59 Id. at 103 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
60

Id.

Under use and derivative use immunity:
[T]he prosecutor may not use the compelled testimony as evidence or
as an investigative lead. The prosecuting attorney may not even use
any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of compelled disclosures. Indeed, once a person testifies under a
grant of use immunity, if the person is later prosecuted, the government bears the burden of showing its evidence is not tainted, by establishing that it had an independent, legitimate source for the
evidence objected to.
RICHARD B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.12, at 210-11 (1982).
62 The independent source doctrine states that the prosecution can use illegally
obtained evidence if the government also discovered such evidence by lawful
means independent of the misconduct. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
In other words, the exclusionary rule does not apply to cases where the government's misconduct was not the source of the evidence.
63 See infra note 75 (discussing Weeks and the reasons for adopting the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment context).
61
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Statutory Enactment of Use and Derivative Use
Immunity

The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970r 4 created a comprehensive, single federal immunity standard - use and derivative use - and consolidated various federal statutory schemes
governing grants of immunity in judicial, administrative and congressional proceedings. 65 Those compelled to testify through its
provisions were guaranteed that "no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case ... 66
Additionally, the Act provided procedural safeguards to insure that such immunity was not granted carelessly.6 7 In particular, the prosecutor must request an order from the district court
compelling testimony from a recalcitrant witness once the witness has refused to cooperate voluntarily.68 Prior to this request,
however, the prosecutor must secure approval of the Attorney
General or a designate and the U.S. Attorney for the district, and
certify that the testimony "may be necessary to the public interest
"69

In Kastigarv. United States, 70 the Court held that use and derivative use immunity was constitutionally appropriate as long as
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1988).
The fight against organized crime constituted a significant impetus to the immunity legislation. The House Judiciary Committee stated that the statute's purpose was to enhance "the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process" to counter
the increasing influence of organized crime. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073.
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws played an important role in developing the new immunity statutes by submitting a model immunity act that served as a prototype for 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005. Report of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (2d Interim Report,
March 19, 1969), in Federal Immunity of Witness Act: Hearings on H.R. 11157 and H.R.
12041 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of The House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 36-39 (1969).
66 18 U.S.C § 6002 (1988).
67 The decision to grant immunity is made by the prosecutor after a simple costbenefit analysis. See Note, supra note 45, at 180 ("The prosecutor is in a good position to determine the possible costs. Presumably, he will grant immunity only when
he is sure the information is worth more to society than the reduced chance of the
witness's conviction.").
68 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988). Assuming that the request is technically sufficient,
the district court "shall issue" the immunity order. Id. § 6003(a).
69 Id. § 6003(b); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.175 (1992) (authorizing the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to
approve requests for immunity orders).
70 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
64

65
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the testimony of a witness was not used against him directly or
indirectly: "One raising a claim [of immunity] under this statute
need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in
order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving
that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources."' 7 ' Thus, the privilege extends not
only to the answers that in and of themselves would support a
criminal conviction, but also to those answers that would furnish
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.72
The Kastigar Court outlined the government's heavy burden
of demonstrating its compliance with these requirements: "This
burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not limited
to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the
affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." ' 73 In short, the compelled witness was to receive a promise that the evidence provided would not
disadvantage him because the Fifth Amendment "prohibits the
71 Id. at 461-62. The Circuits have generally found, however, that this "heavy
burden" may be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v.
Harris, 973 F.2d 333, 336-37 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,
873, modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991);
United States v. Overmyer, 899 F.2d 457, 462-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
344 (1990); United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1578 (11 th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); United States v. Williams, 817 F.2d 1136, 1138
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d
1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988); United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245,
249 (7th Cir. 1990) (strict showing); United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 25
(2d Cir. 1989) (heavy burden); United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418, 1422
(D.N.J. 1984) (clear and convincing); United States v. Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. 759,
772 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (clear and convincing).
72 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951). As the Counselman Court observed, ChiefJustice Marshall was responsible
for the first enunciation of the "link in the chain" analogy. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 566 (1892). While sitting on the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Virginia, the Chief Justice declared that:
Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It appears ... to be the true
sense of the rule, that no witness is compellable to furnish any one of
them against himself. It is certainly not only a possible, but a probable case, that a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may complete the

testimony against himself .... That fact of itself might be unavailing,

but all other facts without it would be insufficient .... The rule which
declares that no man is compellable to accuse himself, would most
obviously be infringed, by compelling a witness to disclose a fact of
this description.
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 565-66 (quoting Burr's Trial, 1 Burr's Trial 244 (1807)).
73 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
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prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in
any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot
74
lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness."
III.

VINDICATION OF VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

THROUGH EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND THEIR
EXCEPTIONS

A.

Fourth Amendment

The genesis of the exclusionary rule is the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure jurisprudence.75 By the mid-1920s, it
was clear that the Fourth Amendment mandated exclusion of illegally seized evidence in federal cases. 76 Early in the history of the
exclusionary rule, an exception permitting the receipt of evidence proving the same facts as the tainted, excluded evidence
evolved - the independent source doctrine.7 7
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, however, was not
initially incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and
made applicable to the states. 78 Then, in 1961, the Supreme
Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,79 overruling precedent and holding
that the states were required to exclude illegally obtained evidence. 8° The Mapp Court articulated three rationales for the exclusionary rule: i) such exclusion constituted a personal right of
74 Id. at 453.

75 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court stated that exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence was required to give the Fourth Amendment

meaning:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used

in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the [Fourth] Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.
Id. at 393. After his retirement, Justice Stewart wrote a thorough, straightforward
account of the exclusionary rule cases that describes the "twists and turns" of the
early case law. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L.
REV.

1365, 1372-77 (1983).

76 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925) (prohibiting use of evi-

dence obtained without a search warrant); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
303 (1921) (same).
77 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)
("[Tihis does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessi-

ble. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others .... ").
78 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
79 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
80 Id. at 656-57.
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the accused; ii) exclusion would deter future violations by the police; and iii) notions of judicial integrity.8 ' The Warren Court's
federalization of the exclusionary rule in Mapp eventually resulted in a shift in rationales insofar as the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have repeatedly emphasized deterrence of police misconduct as the sole rationale for the exclusionary rule.8 2
The notion that the Fourth Amendment creates a personal
right of exclusion is not supported by its text. 3 In addition, the
historical basis for the Fourth Amendment was the Framers' concern that warrantless searches - an abuse employed by the
Crown - could become a practice of the new central govern81 See id. at 655-56 ("the exclusion doctrine... [is] an essential part of the right
to privacy"); id. at 656 ("the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it' ") (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960)); id. at 659 (" 'For good or for ill, [the government] teaches the

whole people by its example .

. .

. If the Government becomes a law breaker, it

breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.' ") (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984) ("Standing to invoke
the [exclusionary] rule has thus been limited to cases in which the prosecution
seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search against the victim of police misconduct.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) ("The Court,
however, has established that the 'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, 'is
to deter future unlawful police conduct.' "); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974) (exclusionary rule comprises "a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
Several empirical studies have attempted to show whether the exclusionary
rule in fact promotes police compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Recent studies by Myron Orfield demonstrate that police practices have improved. See Myron
W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992) (observing that the rule deters improper police behavior and has been a prime factor in professionalization of
the police force, but that a substantial amount of perjury by police nonetheless
occurs in suppression hearings); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016
(1987) (same). For an "economic school" analysis concluding that the exclusionary
rule is a poor tool to deter police misconduct, see Charles F. Campbell, Jr., An
Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Errorand Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L.
REV. 499, 527-29 (1990).
83 The Fourth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause ....
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In other words, "the people" are to
be protected against warrantless searches that have not been approved by an independent magistrate. Reasonable searches, necessary to detect and punish
criminals, are authorized.
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ment. 84 Indeed, "[t]he most famous English and colonial search
and seizure cases involved innocent citizens."1a5 Thus, history
and the Constitution's text suggest that criminal suspects are not
the intended beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment, but instead, similar to the community at large, may obtain its benefits.8 6
Likewise, the focus on judicial integrity has changed.8 7 In
particular, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have expressed concerns about the costs that the exclusionary rule imposes on society. 88 Accordingly, the post-Mapp Court has established
84 For several sources that extensively describe the historical abuses-the general warrant and writs of assistance-that precipitated the Fourth Amendment, see
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-105 (1970); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30-48 (1966).
85 Arnold H. Loewy, Police-ObtainedEvidence and the Constitution:Distinguishing Un-

constitutionally Obtained Evidencefrom Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV.
907, 909 (1989).
86 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) ("Although it is frequently invoked in criminal trials, the Fourth Amendment is not a trial right; the
protection it affords against governmental intrusion into one's home and affairs
pertains to all citizens."). This societal concern was also poignantly expressed by
Justice Jackson:
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of
many admirable qualities but deprived of these ights to know that the
human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Commentators have also focused on the beneficial aspects to society:
The exclusionary rule protects innocent people by eliminating the incentive to search and seize unreasonably. So long as a policeman
knows that any evidence he obtains in violation of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment will not help secure a conviction he has less reason to
violate the [A]mendment and more reason to try to understand it.
Arnold H. Loewy, The FourthAmendment as a Devicefor Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 1229, 1266-67 (1983).
87 See Courtenay Bass, Note, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger
Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 363, 365 (1981) (commenting on the judicial integrity
rationale for the exclusionary rule).
88 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (exclusion of probative
evidence is "drastic and socially costly"); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 90708 (1984) (exclusionary rule interferes with truth finding process and its indiscriminate application "may well 'generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of
justice' ") (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)). Cf. J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 13-15 (1979) (emphasizing costs to the fair administration of justice and interference with legitimate police work); John H.
Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 482
(1922) ("[The exclusionary rule] puts [courts] in the position of assisting to under-
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exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that
serve to limit the receipt of evidence to those circumstances in
which deterrence of police misconduct would be promoted."9
As noted, prior to the Burger era, the independent source
exception to the exclusionary rule had been developed.90 In addition, the "attenuation" doctrine existed, recognizing that the
connection between an illegal search and seizure may be too remote to support exclusion. 91 A Fourth Amendment impeachment exception, which permits the use of illegally obtained
evidence to prevent the defendant from lying on the stand, was
recognized in the 1954 case of Walder v. United States.92 More recently, the Court grafted a "good faith" exception onto the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, permitting admission of
evidence obtained during the execution of a defective search warrant 9 3 or under an invalid statute. 94 The inevitable discovery
mine the foundations of the very institutions they are set there to protect. It regards the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community than
the unpunished murderer ....").
89 Although the shift in focus to solely a deterrence rationale probably better
accords with the Fourth Amendment's language and purpose, the change has not
passed without criticism. See, e.g., Lane V. Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 145 n.31
(1978) (discussing empirical studies of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 253-54 (1974) (studying
Justice Powell's and Justice Brennan's opposing views regarding the justification for
the exclusionary rule).
90 See supra note 75 (discussing the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States). Whether the independent source doctrine truly constitutes
an exclusionary rule exception is debatable. Rather, the actual existence of an independent source serves as an alternative means of admitting that which would
otherwise be tainted. The existence of this untainted alternative does not make the
tainted evidence per se admissible, but rather means that the foundation upon
which admissibility is established is different. In other words, it is a parallel untainted source. John E. Fennelly, Inevitable Discovery: An Overview, THE ARMY LAwYER, Jan. 1988, at 12.
91 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) ("As a matter of good
sense . . .such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint."). Again, whether attenuation is truly an exception is debatable: the attenuation doctrine serves to define and delineate the extent of taint. Perhaps that which
falls outside is better described as untainted, rather than being admitted through an
exception.
92 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Fourth
Amendment to impeach direct testimony). See also United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620 (1980) (extension of impeachment exception to cross-examination).
93 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (facially valid warrant relied upon
in good faith). The good faith exception comprises a true exception: because the
warrant is defective, the seized materials have been obtained, in effect, in a prohibited warrantless search. Accordingly, Leon is properly recognized as an exception,
rather than a delineation of taint.
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doctrine, 95 which holds that evidence that was in fact obtained improperly is nonetheless admissible if it would inevitably have
been discovered by lawful means, 96 resulted from this balancing
process.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to specify the proofs
97
that are required to invoke the inevitable discovery exception,
the Court has clearly expressed the exception's rationale - to
"ensure that the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply
because of some earlier police error or misconduct." 98 To satisfy
the exception, lower federal courts have attempted to articulate
tests that are designed to admit evidence that would have been
94 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (exclusion not required even though
search warrant relies on statute later declared unconstitutional).
95 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-48 (1984) (notwithstanding breach of
Sixth Amendment right, inevitable discovery doctrine found applicable to Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases). See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text
(reviewing Nix).
96 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4(a), at 378-88 (2d ed. 1987).
97 The Court has suggested that inevitable discovery has its own distinct requirements, although such requirements remain undelineated. See Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988) ("The inevitable discovery doctrine, with
its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source
doctrine: since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered
through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have
been discovered."). In his Nix concurrence, however, Justice Stevens concluded
that inevitable discovery is applicable if the prosecution can show that "at the time
of the constitutional violation an investigation was already under way which, in the
natural and probable course of events, would have soon discovered the [evidence]." Nix, 467 U.S. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority opinion
does not state whether an alternative investigation is required. Justice Brennan's
dissent would require the government to show that such an investigation was underway and to satisfy a clear and convincing standard. Id. (BrennanJ., dissenting).
According to one pre-Nix commentary, the critical factor in inevitable discovery analysis should be whether an investigation was prompted, expanded or
refocused as a result of tainted material:
If the illegality was critical in initiating or determining the direction
and form of the investigation, regardless of the legal sufficiency of the
untainted evidence, the defendant's rights were clearly impaired because of the misconduct and the resultant evidence must be excluded.
But if in the absence of the illegality an investigation would have occurred and proceeded in a manner that would inevitably have led to
discovery of the questioned evidence, the police derived no actual
benefit from that misconduct, no substantial infringement of the defendant's constitutional rights took place, and the evidence can justifiably be admitted.
Harold S. Novikoff, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary
Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 102 (1974).
98 Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. Interestingly, even though the Nix majority did not describe the proofs necessary to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine, it insisted
that the exception involves no speculative elements, but rather focuses on historical
facts capable of ready verification or impeachment. Id. at 445 n.5.
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uncovered even in the absence of police misconduct.9 9 Although
these tests rely on historic facts, the inferences drawn from such
facts are necessarily speculative. The inevitable discovery doctrine's hypothetical nature means that rules of law cannot prevent inappropriate application of the doctrine. "What would
have happened" is in a very real way unknowable. Thus, by definition, the inevitable discovery doctrine presents a greater possibility of error than the independent source doctrine.
Despite these risks, the potential availability of the inevitable
discovery exception may be, on balance, responsive to the societal-based purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, the
question becomes one of burden of proof and risk of error.'0 0
Although there is some disagreement in these areas, the inevitable discovery doctrine seems fundamentally sound in the Fourth
Amendment context.
B.

Sixth Amendment
Cases involving the right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-

99 The circuits have split on the applicable test. R. Bradley Lamberth, Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: ProceduralSafeguards to Ensure Inevitability, 40
BAYLOR L. REV. 129, 141-43 (1988). In United States v. Cherry, the Fifth Circuit required the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there
was "a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered" by
lawful means "in the absence of police misconduct," and (2) "that the government
was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of investigation at the time of the
constitutional violation." United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987). The requirement that the government
demonstrate an active, alternative line of investigation has been accepted by several
other circuits. See United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Ivey, 915 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d
948, 960 (11 th Cir. 1990).
Other circuits have rejected the requirement in favor of a more "flexible" approach. See United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring
that "the fact or likelihood that makes discovery inevitable arise from circumstances
other than those disclosed by the illegal search itself") (quoting United States v.
Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1987)); United States v. Silvestri, 787
F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (requirement too rigid in cases where a search warrant is eventually obtained), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
100 A well-written comment urged that the government be required to show by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have inevitably discovered the tainted
evidence. Lamberth, supra note 99, at 145-46. In addition, another commentator
urged that a showing of good faith constitutes a prerequisite to application of inevitable discovery. John E. Fennelly, Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The
Need for a Good Faith Requirement, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085 (1991). Despite
both arguments' merit, Nix rejected each of these requirements. See supra note 97
(noting that the requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine remain
undelineated).
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ment' 0 are somewhat more problematic because this right is less
susceptible to categorization. During the Warren era, the
Supreme Court's language in Sixth Amendment cases suggested
that the right to counsel was a fundamental, personal right not
subject to balancing, rather than an independent pretrial wrong
to be remedied through judicious application of the exclusionary
rule. 102
There have been two notable exceptions to the Sixth
Amendment rights-based jurisprudence. First, the Burger Court
employed a balancing approach in Nix v. Williams, l0 3 adopting the
inevitable discovery doctrine in the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel context.' 0 4 In Nx, the defendant, Williams, had surrendered in Davenport, Iowa, on kidnapping and murder charges
and, after invoking his right to counsel,' 0 5 was transported back
to Des Moines, 160 miles away. 10 6 The victim's body had not
been recovered when the trip began. 10 7 During the ride, a police
officer accompanying Williams initiated a conversation by stating
that because the girl's body might never be found, and the victim
101 The Sixth Amendment reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (per se exclusionary rule when
right to counsel at lineup was violated); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73
(1967) (same); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) ("All that we
hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal
agents under the circumstance here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the
prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.") (emphasis added, except for
"him").
103 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cases provided the Court with the independent source doctrine employed in Nix. See Silas
Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a
Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 135 (1984) (maintaining that the Nix majority
"seeks to justify the adoption of the inevitable discovery exception by analogy to
the independent source doctrine of the [Flourth [A]mendment exclusionary rule").
104 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
105 Id. Williams was arraigned in Davenport and represented by counsel by the
time the return trip commenced. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 391 (1977).
Brewer held that Williams was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel, a decision from which ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun
and Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 406.
Nix arose upon Williams' petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his postBrewer state court conviction for murder. Id. at 439. Presented again with the
Brewer facts, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Burger writing the majority
opinion, declared: "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means [then] the evidence should be received." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Nix. Id. at 458-60.
106 Id. at 434-35.
107 Id. at 435.
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would not receive "a Christian burial."' 8 Thereafter, Williams
confessed and led the officers to the girl's body. 10 9
The Court ruled that the body was admissible, by virtue of
the inevitable discovery doctrine, because an organized search
was shown to have been "approaching the actual location of the
body ....,"I"0 The record reflected that police would have inevitably discovered the body, but for its prior tainted discovery."'
Again, the Court focused on deterrence as providing a counterbalance to exclusion: "If the prosecution can establish . . . that
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovhas so little
ered by lawful means . . .then the deterrence' rationale
2
basis that the evidence should be received." "
108 Id. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Nix quoted the officer's speech

as such:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling
down the road. .

.

. They are predicting several inches of snow for

tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows
where this little girl's body is ...and if you get a snow on top of it you
yourself may be unable to find it. .

.

. I feel that we could stop and

locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to
a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them
on Christmas [Elve and murdered ....
Id. at 435.
In Brewer, four Justices dissented and found that Williams's disclosures were
voluntary. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 415-41. Significantly, Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justices White and Rehnquist, discussed the case in Miranda terms rather than
with regard to core Sixth Amendment rights. See id.at 438-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The fourth dissenter, ChiefJustice Burger, concluded that the defendant
had made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights. See id. at 418 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stewart's majority opinion did not address whether Williams's responses were voluntary and also did not attempt to distinguish between a core
Sixth Amendment violation and a violation of a prophylactic standard. See id. at
397-98. This approach is hardly surprising inasmuch as the jurisprudence distinguishing between core rights and Miranda procedural requirements was yet to be
developed in the Sixth Amendment context at the time of Brewer. See infra notes
113-19 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan v. Harvey and its separation of
the notion of a "prophylactic rule" from a direct violation of the Sixth Amendment). A foreshadowing of the distinction and the battle lines, however, can be
drawn from Brewer with little effort.
109 Nix, 467 U.S. at 436. The Court affirmed the exclusion of the confession in
Brewer. The Brewer Court also suggested that the body's location and condition
"might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered
in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams."
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 407 n. 12.
11 Nix, 467 U.S. at 449.
111 Id. at 449-50. But c.f Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a
Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977) (suggesting the problematic nature of
inevitable discovery under the Brewer facts).
i12 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
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Second, in Michigan v. Harvey," 3 the Court permitted a statement obtained in violation of a suspect's right to counsel to be
used on cross-examination."' The Court's language is quite interesting because it separates the notion of a "prophylactic
rule""' 5 from a direct violation of the Sixth Amendment. 1 6 In
particular, the Court in Harvey essentially duplicated the analysis
that it had previously used in Miranda cases implicating Fifth
Amendment concerns:
There is no reason for a different result [here] where the prophylactic rule is designed to ensure voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
rather than the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or "right to counsel." . . . We have never prevented
use by the prosecution of relevant voluntary statements by a
defendant, particularly when the violations alleged by a defendant relate only to procedural safeguards that are "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution," [Miranda
rules], but are instead measures designed to ensure that constitutional rights are protected.' 7
By construing the case as one involving prophylactic Miranda rules,
rather than a core violation of the Sixth Amendment, the Harvey
Court was able to invoke a deterrence-based analysis. 1 8 Indeed,
with Harvey's analysis and the Nix majority's use of deterrence language, it is now entirely possible to view Nix as a Miranda case,
113

494 U.S. 344 (1990).

114 See id.
115 A prophylactic rule establishes procedural protections designed to effectuate
a right. The concept finds its genesis in Miranda v. Arizona, which requires police to
inform arrested persons that: 1) they have the right to remain silent when taken
into custody; 2) anything they say can and will be used against them in court; 3)
they have a right to consult with a lawyer; and 4) that a lawyer will be appointed for
them if they cannot afford one. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
Once a suspect invokes the right to remain silent, the police must cease their questioning. Id. at 473-74. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court established a further prophylactic rule: once the suspect has invoked the right to remain silent, waiver
cannot occur as a result of police-initiated interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
116 Michigan v. Jackson, to effectuate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, established a cognate prophylactic rule derived from Edwards: once the suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police-initiated questioning cannot result in a waiver.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
117 Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
118 With core violations, the Court explicitly left open the question of whether
any sort of balancing would be permissible. See id. at 354. There can be little
doubt, however, that the denial of trial counsel in contravention of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and its progeny would constitute reversible error per
se. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967) (citing cases).
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rather than a core Sixth Amendment case." 19
C.

Fifth Amendment

Unlike the Fourth or Sixth Amendments, the Fifth Amendment operates directly as an exclusionary rule.1 20 Fifth Amendment cases are of two types: Miranda violations and core Fifth
Amendment violations. 12 1 Core violations involve cases where
the witness has actually been compelled to testify. Alternatively,
Fifth Amendment Miranda issues are dealt with in the same manner as Sixth Amendment Miranda issues.
In particular, Miranda violations, whether involving Fifth or
Sixth Amendment concerns, do not constitute core violations.
The existence of several exclusionary "exceptions" in the Fifth
Amendment Miranda context confirms this observation.12 2 Indeed, it is possible, as Justice O'Connor suggested in Oregon v.
Elstad,12 3 that violations of Miranda's prophylactic rules will not
necessarily result in the suppression of derivative evidence:
[T]he Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes
of the prosecution's case in chief, does not require that the
statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.
Despite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in vio119 In Nix, the majority avoided a discussion of whether the exclusion there resulted from a core violation or a Miranda violation by assuming that the inevitable
discovery doctrine is consistent with the core conception of the Sixth Amendment.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 446. In other words, the Court failed to discuss whether Sixth
Amendment exclusion constitutes a core right or a remedy. Patricia Lyn Hurst,
Note, Overriding a Constitutional Governor: The Supreme Court's Application of the Impeachment Exception in Michigan v. Harvey to the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 551, 568 n.149 (1991); James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion:
Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751, 764-65 (1989).
Harvey makes evident that the issues in the Nix case apparently were prophylactic in
nature. In a Nix concurrence, Justice White explicitly viewed the case as a Miranda
issue and reiterated the view that the Court had become " 'lost in the intricacies of
the prophylactic rules of Miranda v. Arizona .. " N.ix, 467 U.S. at 450-51 (White,J.,
concurring) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 438 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)). Observed in such a light, Nix is no longer the outlier that it appears on
initial examination. Rather, Nix is simply another "police practices" case in which
Miranda balancing mitigates the loss of probative evidence through another exception to the exclusionary rule.
120 Loewy, supra note 85, at 926 ("[Tlhe [F]ifth [A]mendment does not contain
an exclusionary rule; it is itself an exclusionary rule.").
121 Fifth Amendment Miranda rules do not constitute the actual privilege against
self-incrimination, but rather "prophylactic standards [designed] to safeguard that
privilege." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
122 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (cross-examination exception).
123

470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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lation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution's
case, the presumption of coercion does not bar
their use for
24
impeachment purposes on cross-examination.'
Thus, whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is applicable
to Miranda Fifth Amendment cases is debatable.12 5 In any event, it
is certain that balancing, as used in police practice cases of all types,
is employed in the Fifth Amendment Miranda context.
There is, however, a bifurcation in the Court's approach to
Fifth Amendment core cases and Miranda cases. The use of coerced
confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because of the basic
principle that our criminal law system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial.' 2 6 Plainly, "[t]estimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony."' 2 7
Consequently, the use of immunized testimony is absolutely
prohibited:
In such cases there is no question whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant's will; the witness is
told to talk or face the government's coercive sanctions ....
The information given in response to a grant of immunity may
well be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless
defendant, but it is no less compelled ....

Balancing of inter-

ests was thought to be necessary in [Miranda cases] when the
attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided with the
need to prevent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal with the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing,
therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is
28
impermissible. 1

The Harvey Court cited, with approval, this "no balancing rule" for
core violations. 1

29

In short, the Supreme Court appears to recognize that in core
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, immunity cases for example, balancing is inappropriate. Balancing, however, has been repeatedly
applied in the Fifth Amendment Miranda context. The "second
class" status of Miranda violations has not escaped severe critiId. at 307 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
For a complete exposition of this point, see Mark S. Bransdorfer, Note, Miranda Right-to-Counsel Violations and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 62 IND. L.J.
1061, 1078-82 (1987).
126 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1256 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in
part) (dissenting from application of harmless error analysis to coerced
confessions).
124
125

127

New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979).

128

Id. (emphasis added).

129

Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990).
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cism. 3 0 Regardless of this criticism, the case law recognizes that
Fifth Amendment core values are entitled to a higher level of protection - no balancing whatsoever.

IV.

THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE CROSSES OVER TO
IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE: THE STRECK AND
HAZELWOOD CASES

Two recent cases involving immunity and the potential application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to derivative evidence have reached opposite conclusions. The first case, United
States v. Streck,' 3 ' applies the doctrine without substantial discussion. The second, Hazelwood v. Alaska,1 32 holds the doctrine inapplicable as a matter of law.
A.

The Streck Case

On November 3, 1988, Donald W. Streck was indicted for
federal income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. s3 In
essence, the indictment charged Streck with receiving approximately $1,800,000 from a Francis J. Walsh, Jr., and his closelyheld companies in 1983, 1984 and 1985, and failing to report the
money as income. 1 34 The government's position was that the
funds were either the proceeds of an embezzlement or commissions. Streck, on the other hand, argued that because he had
taken the funds as a result of a business dispute, they did not
constitute current income. Alternatively, Streck argued that he
lacked the willfulness to violate the tax laws due to the unresolved nature of the transactions with Walsh.
Prior to his indictment, Streck was immunized in connection
with a grand jury investigation in the Northern District of California. 3 5 The grand jury investigation led to Walsh's indictment on
mail fraud charges. During the course of these proceedings, the
130 See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 85, at 927-28 ("If the court cannot accept Miranda
for its proper [F]ifth [A]mendment value, perhaps it should overrule it. Preferably,
it should take that [F]ifth [A]mendment value seriously.").
131 958 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1992).
132 836 P.2d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
133 United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 1988). Streck
and his wife, Debra L. Streck, were also jointly charged with bankruptcy fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152. Both were acquitted of these charges.
134 It was undisputed that Streck did not report approximately $1 million of these

receipts as income in those years.
135 In re Donald W. Streck A Witness Before The Special Grand Jury, Cr. No. 85566 Misc. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1985). The compulsion order can be found in the
district court record, United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19,
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government gave several immunized admissions by Streck to
Walsh's attorneys in discovery. A March 23, 1987 letter from the
prosecutor to Walsh's attorneys noted:
When Streck commenced work in 1983 as a financial consultant with Francis J. Walsh, .

.

. Streck and Walsh agreed on a

compensation package that included a 2 percent commission
on any financing transactions that Streck would arrange for
Walsh. Between 1983 and 1986 there were a number of occasions when Mr. Walsh did not pay Streck's commission when it
was due. As a consequence, Streck began secretly diverting
funds that were due from Walsh to
reimburse himself for the
36
receive.'
not
did
he
commissions
The letter further observed that "Streck secretly diverted in excess
of $1,000,000" by endorsing Walsh's checks to a closely-held company, ACI.3 7
After receipt of this immunized letter, Walsh's attorneys reported the information to the New Jersey bankruptcy court where
3 8
several of Walsh's companies and Walsh himself were debtors.
The bankruptcy court in turn provided this information to the
United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey and, shortly
thereafter, several of Walsh's companies instituted an adversary
39
proceeding against Streck seeking recovery of some of the funds.'
The adversary proceeding was the first time Walsh had disputed Streck's claim, even though Walsh was previously aware of a
substantial diversion of funds by Streck. Testimony from Walsh
representatives showed that, in September 1985, Walsh was already
aware that Streck had taken approximately $400,000. 140 Streck was
not fired, but instead continued as a financial consultant with the
Walsh entities until June 1986.
In 1985, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) commenced a civil
audit of Streck's tax returns. The Revenue Agent conducting the
audit ultimately referred Streck's 1984 and 1985 tax returns to the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the IRS in May 1987.141
1988), Statement of CharlesJ. Walsh Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, dated December 19, 1988 at 9 [hereinafter Walsh Statement] (Record Entry No. 9).
136 Id. at Exhibit C.
137

Id.

138 Walsh Statement, supra note 135,
14.
139 Walsh Trucking Co., v. Streck, Case Nos. 85-03260, 85-03266, 85-03286, 8503287, 85-03267, Adv. No. 87-0880 TG (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 6, 1987).
140 United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 1988), Record
No. 99 at 67-25 to 68-11 (testimony of Marc L. Zoldessy).
141 At the time the Revenue Agent referred these returns to the CID, she did not
know the source of the 1984 and 1985 funds and had made no effort to contact the
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Shortly thereafter, the CID assigned an IRS Special Agent to conduct a Cincinnati-based criminal tax investigation. The Special
Agent apparently then learned about a New Jersey-based investigation concerning Streck and contacted an Assistant United States Attorney in the Newark, New Jersey office.' 4 2
The Special Agent subsequently travelled to New Jersey and reviewed documents at the United States Attorneys' Office, but was
denied access to documents that the New Jersey federal prosecutors
had obtained from the Northern District of California. 4 ' The Assistant United States Attorney assigned, however, directed the Special
Agent to "public records" relating to the Walsh-Streck adversary
proceeding available through the Assistant United States Bankruptcy Trustee.' 4 4 It is undisputed that at the Trustee's office the
Special Agent came in contact with fruits of the immunized letter no
later than November 17, 1987 - almost one year prior to Streck's
indictment and before any of the witnesses were interviewed.
In his initial appeal, Streck argued that the government had not
satisfied its Kastigar obligations and that, in any event, the district
court had not made the specific findings necessary for appellate review.' 4 5 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the latter point and remanded the immunity question to the district court with the
direction to "make specific findings as [to] the independent sources
from which the government's grand jury evidence was derived."' 4 6
On remand, the district court relied on the independent source
doctrine. Specifically, the court found that Walsh representatives
were independent sources because Walsh "had independently uncovered misappropriations around September of 1985 and June of
Walsh companies. United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 3,
1988); Record No. 39, 44-17 to 45-13 (testimony of Mary E. Kifer). The district
court appeared to find that Kifer did not know that the Walsh companies were the
sources of these funds. United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096, at 5 (S.D. Ohio,
Mar. 27, 1992) (Record Entry No. 115).
142 Id. at 6.
143 Affidavit ofJames R. Kuntz, dated February 16, 1989, at 3-4, United States v.
Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 1988) (Record Entry No. 24).
144

Id.

145 The district court conducted a pretrial Kastigar hearing in which the Special
Agent and the Revenue Agent testified. In an order dated March 22, 1989, the
district court found that the government met its Kastigar burden, but made no specific findings of fact. United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22,
1989) (Record Entry No. 35).
146 United States v. Streck, 914 F.2d 1495 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 1990) (per curiam)
(table) (available on WESTLAW). The district court was also directed to "make its
findings under either the 'inevitable discovery' or the 'independent sources' doctrine, but it should make clear which doctrine it is applying so as to avoid confusion
on review." Id.
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1986."147
In the second appeal, the Sixth Circuit tacitly rejected the findings of independence, but affirmed on the inevitable discovery doctrine. 14 8 In particular, the appellate panel tersely concluded:
There are simply no grounds for believing that, prior to their
exposure to the [prosecutor's] letter, Walsh representatives
would have mistakenly told [the Special Agent] that the disputed funds were loans rather than something else. Accordingly, we find it beyond dispute that [the Special Agent] would
have discovered that the funds were not
loans even if the
49
[prosecutor's] letter had never existed. 1
The Sixth Circuit's finding of inevitable discovery ultimately
rests, as all such findings, on supposition. The district court made
few findings relating to the Special Agent's criminal investigation.
Many of the limited findings suggested investigative use.' 50 In par147 United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 1991) (Record
Entry No. 115) (emphasis added).
148 United States v. Streck, 958 F.2d 141, 146 (6th Cir. 1992).
149 Id. In the absence of the immunized letter, there was no reason to believe
that Walsh representatives, as opposed to Walsh himself, would have known about
the diverted funds. Moreover, given the close connection of the diversions to underlying transactions for which Walsh was indicted, Walsh himself was unavailable
as a witness.
150 Investigative use is prohibited because it enhances the quality and quantity of
evidence available against the immunized witness and is therefore an evidentiary use
of the witness's compelled testimony. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
460 (1972) ("This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard,
barring the use of compelled testimony as an 'investigatory lead .
) (footnote
omitted).
The courts are divided over whether other advantages, so-called non-evidentiary uses, are prohibited. See United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th
Cir. 1973) ("Such use[s] could conceivably include assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise planning trial strategy."). The
Third and Eighth Circuits clearly bar non-evidentiary uses. See United States v.
Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1983); McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311. The District
of Columbia Circuit has stated in dicta that non-evidentiary use is "troubling."
United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 860, modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991). Other circuits, however, permit non-evidentiary
use. See United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1472-74 (7th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Crowson, 828
F.2d 1427, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988); United States
v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1528-31 (11 th Cir. 1985). Likewise, recent Second Circuit
case law has suggested that non-evidentiary use of immunized materials may be
permissible or is harmless. United States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991); United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 599 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989). Even under these cases, however,
proof of the lack of prior independent knowledge of a material fact would be sufficient to show improper use. See United States v. Kristel, 762 F. Supp. 1100, 1107
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("This Court does not read either Rivieccio or Miriani [sic] as sup-
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ticular, the trial judge found that the Special Agent "requested subpoenaed bank account records and books of the various Frank
Walsh corporations" after learning of the suspicion of a New Jersey
Assistant U.S. Attorney "that the unreported income was coming
from Frank Walsh or his related entities . . . ."'
This finding suggested that the Special Agent's investigation was affected by immunized materials from its inception." 2
Even assuming that the Special Agent did not learn of the immunized letter until November 1987, the letter undoubtedly helped
organize and focus his investigation. As noted, no witnesses had
been interviewed. Thus, by the time Walsh representatives were interviewed, the immunized letter had provided the investigator with
an organizing principle for his interviews. More significantly, the
immunized letter had irretrievably altered the knowledge and apparent attitude of Walsh and his representatives. Consequently, testimony from Walsh representatives helped strengthen the
government's case on two issues current taxability and
willfulness.
The Sixth Circuit's application of the inevitable discovery docporting the Government's contention that immunized testimony ... can properly
be used as an investigatory lead or as a means of focusing an investigation in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Kastigar. In the present case, unlike Rivieccio
and Miriani [sic], there has been no showing that the Government . . . had prior
knowledge from an untainted source .... ").
151 United States v. Streck, Cr. No. 1-88-096, at 6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 1991)
(Record Entry No. 115).
152 Streck was not able to develop this point in the absence of discovery from the
government. Significantly, the criminal defendant generally possesses no right of
access to any of the government's papers prepared in connection with the investigation of the case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b). Due to Rule 16b and Rule 6(e)-relating
to the secrecy of grand jury proceedings-or both, immunized defendants rarely
have been granted significant discovery, such as access to grand jury materials, to
prepare for Kastigar hearings. But cf. United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418
(D.NJ. 1984) (district court conducts a twenty-six day Kastigarhearing in which the
government agents who conducted the investigation testified and were cross-examined by defense counsel); United States v. Dornau, 356 F. Supp. 1091, 1097-98
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (granting access to grand jury minutes), rev'd on other grounds, 491
F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
Lacking discovery, Streck's counsel were unaware of the basis for the district
court's conclusion on this point inasmuch as there was no testimony at the Kostigar
hearing from the Special Agent that would support such a finding. Counsel believe
that the finding was either based on grand jury materials (to which Streck was denied access) or perhaps even was a mistake. The Sixth Circuit disregarded the argument that if the Special Agent's decision to subpoena Walsh's various bank
records was motivated by derivative use of the immunized letter, the whole focus of
the IRS investigation was turned by the use of Streck's immunized statements. See
Streck, 958 F.2d at 143 n.l.
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trine in the context of an immunity case apparently was a first.' 5 3 In
fact, the appellate panel relied on Nix v. Williams,' 5" the only
Supreme Court case that has approved the doctrine's use.15 5 The
Sixth Circuit cited no case involving the inevitable discovery doctrine and immunity."5 6
153 In United States v. North, the District of Columbia Circuit briefly mentioned the
inevitable discovery doctrine, but did not analyze its potential applicability to immunized testimony. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 943 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991). North itself was not decided on the basis of the
inevitable discovery doctrine.
154 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984).
155 United States v. Streck, 914 F.2d 1495 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 1990) (per curiam)
(table) (available on WESTLAW).
None of the inevitable discovery cases cited in Nix involved an immunity situation. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 440 n.2 (citing cases). See also United States v. Apker, 705
F.2d 293, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1983) (Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984); United States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983) (admissions
that may have been voluntary nonetheless not used, as other evidence resulted
from routine police investigation); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358
(11 th Cir. 1982) (Mirandaviolations cured because an inevitable search would have
otherwise occurred), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207 (1983); United States v. Romero,
692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982) (Fourth Amendment case); Papp v. Jago, 656
F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir.) (applying inevitable discovery rule; Miranda violations),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1035 (1981); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042,
1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (Miranda-violative questioning led to witnesses whose identity
would inevitably have been discovered); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910,
914 (1st Cir. 1980) (Fourth Amendment search and seizure); United States v.
Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1065-66 n.9 (9th Cir.) (dicta stating that if the defendant's
statements had been coerced, inevitable discovery would have made derivative evidence admissible), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978); United States ex rel. Owens v.
Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fourth Amendment case; approving inevitable discovery doctrine in dicta); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502
F.2d 914, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1974) (pistol would have inevitably been found regardless of statement obtained in violation of Miranda;officers heard noises of windows
being opened and object striking rooftop below), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975);
United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir.) (after illegal search of
defendant's wallet provides defendant's identity, defendant arrested with fellow
bank robbers; therefore, identification was inevitable), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913
(1970); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir.) (Fourth Amendment
exclusionary case, emergency situation justifies entry), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963).
It should be noted that these circuit court cases were constrained by more
stringent versions of the inevitable discovery exception than that articulated by the
Nix Court. The Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 123 n.45 (1984)
[hereinafter Leading Cases].
156 See United States v. Streck, 914 F.2d 1495 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 1990) (per
curiam) (table) (available on WESTLAW). The only Fifth Amendment case cited by
the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Martinez-Gallegos, 807 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir.
1987), was a Miranda case, not a core violation or an immunity case.
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B.

The Hazelwood Case
Hazelwood v. Alaska arose from "the largest tanker spill in
United States history."' 157 The Exxon Valdez, captained by Joseph
J. Hazelwood (Hazelwood), ran aground hours after leaving the
port of Valdez, Alaska with a load of 1,260,000 barrels of oil.
Twenty minutes after the grounding, Hazelwood reported that
the ship had "fetched up" and "evidently [was] leaking some oil
...."158 Within two days, the resulting slick of approximately
240,000 barrels of oil covered almost fifty square miles. 159 Hazelwood was subsequently charged and convicted of the negli160
gent discharge of oil under Alaska state law.
On appeal, Hazelwood argued that because he had promptly
notified authorities of the spill, federal law provided him with use
and derivative use immunity of the report and resulting investigations.'61 Hazelwood also argued that the inevitable discovery ex62
ception did not apply as a matter of law.'
The Alaska Court of Appeals found that the nature of immunized statements rendered application of the inevitable discovery
doctrine constitutionally prohibited in the immunity context:
[The] fundamental differences between the exclusion of evidence in cases of illegally obtained evidence and cases of evidence derived from immunized information lead us to
conclude that the inevitable discovery doctrine-an exception
rooted in the pragmatism of the exclusionary rule and its narrow deterrent purpose-has no application in the immunity
context. The use of inevitable discovery in this context would
be directly contrary to the express
protection of the privilege
16 3
against self-incrimination.
In addition, the court found the deterrence rationale inapplicable in
the immunity context because "[e]vidence is not unlawfully obtained when an individual provides information to the government
157 Philip Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil OffAlaska,
N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 1989, at 1.
158 Hazelwood v. Alaska, 836 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
159 Richard Mauer, Alaska Aide Assails Oil Industry For Inadequate Response to Spill,
N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1989, at 1, 22.
160 Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 944. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 46.03.740, .790(a)(1) (1991).
161 Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 945-46. The federal statute requires "[a]ny person in
charge of a vessel" to notify the appropriate governmental agency "as soon as he
has knowledge of any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from such vessel[,]"
but that "[notification received .. .or information obtained by the exploitation of
such notification shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case
.... 33 U.S.C.
.
§ 1321(b)(5) (1988).
162 Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 945-46.
163 Id. at 953.
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under a grant of immunity. Hence, the exclusion of information
that derives from immunized testimony is unrelated to deterrence of
official misconduct ....

164

The Hazelwood court also recognized that promises of immunity
made to an individual in exchange for incriminating statements
must be judicially enforced:
Because the ultimate aim of the constitutional privilege is to
assure that no compelled statement will be used against the
accused in a criminal case, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the first facet of the privilege-its protection against
compulsory elicitation of potentially incriminating statements-may be properly invaded by the government, but only
in exchange for a guarantee that the second facet of the privilege-the use of compelled statements or evidence derived
therefrom-will not be breached.' 6 5
Finally, the court observed that fairness required exclusion:
Although the state, by invoking the inevitable discovery
doctrine, seeks dispensation from the promise of immunity expressly made in the federal statute, it is difficult to see how
such dispensation can be justified. Having gained its evidence
from the exploitation of information it obtained by a promise
of immunity, the state should not be free to renege merely because, in retrospect, the promise appears to have been
unnecessary. 166
V.

ANALYSIS

As noted, in Mapp v. Ohio' 67 the Warren Court identified
three bases for the exclusionary rule: i) a personal right of exclusion; ii) deterrence of police misconduct; and iii) judicial integ164 Id.
165 Id.

at 951.
at 952.
166 Id. at 953. The self-executing nature of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) undoubtedly
does result in immunity grants that are unnecessary in certain instances. Such overbreadth, however, appears to be constitutionally necessary to compel the reporting
of spills in all cases. Specifically, to compel any individual to report a spill, all persons must be promised use and derivative use immunity. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (the witness's "primary interest is that the protection
be certain").
Unfortunately, the Hazelwood court suggested in dicta that "Congress could
have readily carved out an [inevitable discovery] exception" statutorily. Hazelwood,
836 P.2d at 954. The authors submit that this dicta is wrong because, as a matter of
constitutional law, an individual must be promised immunity if he is to be compelled to incriminate himself. This dicta somewhat muddles an otherwise thoughtful, well-reasoned opinion.
167

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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rity. 168 When the Supreme Court approved the concept of use

and derivative use immunity in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor, 169 the protection of personal rights and judicial
integrity were valid exclusionary rule rationales.
Under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, deterrence of police misconduct has become the sole rationale for exclusionary
rules. The other rationales - the personal right of exclusion and
judicial integrity - have been discarded. Similarly, Miranda jurisprudence currently recognizes that deterrence of police misconduct is the primary goal of its rule-based exclusions.
Accordingly, the Court has applied limitations and exceptions to
Miranda-basedexclusionary rules to insure that exclusion actually
serves the purpose of deterrence. Deterrence-based language
now dominates Miranda decisions.
In recognizing the inevitable discovery exception, the Nix
Court explicitly described the rationale behind the exception as
deterrence: "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means-here the volunteers' search-then the deterrence rationale has so little basis
that the evidence should be received."'170 The inevitable discovery exception appears to produce little damage to the deterrence
rationale underlying both Miranda and exclusionary rule
jurisprudence.
In contrast, no deterrence rationale justifies the inevitable
discovery exception in the context of use and derivative use immunity. Specifically, the goal of immunity statutes is to legalize
and encourage this form of investigative tool provided that there is
no self-incriminatory use of the witness's compelled testimony.
Accordingly, exclusion of immunized statements bears no rela17 1
tion to deterrence of police misconduct.
The two other rationales for exclusionary rules that have
been discarded by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts-a personal
right of exclusion and judicial integrity-remain vital in this Fifth
Amendment context. The Fifth Amendment is itself an exclusionary rule that is founded in the personal rights of the accused.
168 See supra text accompanying note 81 (noting the Warren Court's three-fold
rationale for the exclusionary rule).
169 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
170 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
171 The Second Circuit has also recognized that the deterrence rationale is irrelevant in the immunity context. See United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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Likewise, judicial integrity requires courts to enforce immunity
agreements as written. 1 72 Courts participate in the immunitygranting process by ordering the compelled witness to testify and
by use of their contempt powers to enforce such directions. By
excusing the government's promise of immunity in the form of a
judicial order, courts could well be seen as parties to governmental entrapment.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits application of the inevitable
discovery rule to core Fifth Amendment violations.1 73 In contrast to Fourth Amendment cases and violations of the Miranda
rules, the use of compelled testimony constitutes a direct violation of the Fifth Amendment. It cannot be said that the inevitable discovery doctrine, unlike the independent source doctrine
sustained in Kastigar, makes no use in fact of the witness's own
compelled testimony. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment mandates exclusion.
The Hazelwood court correctly found that the Fifth Amendment's constitutional command is absolute:
[T]he United States Supreme Court has been careful to distinguish between the "balancing of interests . . .thought to be
necessary... when the attempt to deter unlawful police conduct" is involved, ... and the less flexible approach toward
excluding evidence that is necessary in immunity cases: Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is
the essence of coerced testimony ....Here, . . . we deal with
the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible . .. .74
In short, when a witness is immunized, 18 U.S.C. § 6002175 guarantees the witness that no use of the testimony or other compelled
172 For reasons of judicial integrity, courts enforce informal immunity agreements. See, e.g., United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Harvey,
869 F.2d 1439 (lth Cir. 1989).
173 See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (prohibiting the application of policy-oriented balancing to core Fifth Amendment violations).
174 Hazelwood v. Alaska, 836 P.2d 943,952 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (quoting New
Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979)).
175 The legislative history of the use and derivative use statute does not specifically discuss whether the inevitable discovery exception should apply to immunized
testimony. Rather, numerous statements simply distinguish use and derivative use
from transactional immunity without precisely delineating the former. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 42 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4017-18 ("This statutory immunity is intended to be as broad
as, but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination. It is designed to
reflect the use-restriction immunity concept.., rather than the transaction immu-
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76
information will be made. 1
The Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental value judgment that the criminal justice system in the United States should be
accusatorial rather than inquisitorial.1 77 The Amendment was motivated by historical abuses found in early Anglo-American justice:
No doubt the constitutional privilege may, on occasion, save a
guilty man from his just deserts. It was aimed at a more farreaching evil - a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star
Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Prevention of the
greater evil was deemed of more importance than occurrence
of the lesser evil. Having had much experience with a tendency in human nature to abuse power, the Founders sought
to close the doors against like future abuses by law-enforcing

agencies. 178

The privilege against self-incrimination protects values other than
the strict determination of facts, such as the prevention of abuse of
power, which are fundamental to our criminal justice system. These
systemic concerns, and not deterrence of police misadventure, justify exclusion.
This balance of power rationale also suggests practical reasons
why the inevitable discovery exception should not apply. Specifically, the decision to grant immunity is a deliberate and intentional
act 1 79 that may make it impossible to later prosecute the witness. In
nity concept .... ). In fact, it appears that Congress's conception of the exclusionary rule apparently assumed that the Court treated all violations similarly:
[T]he immunity grant would constitute a ground for the suppression
of the use of compelled testimony and the fruits of that testimony,
rather than a total defense. It would be a use restriction, a use restriction similar to the exclusionary rule which is now applied against such
things as involuntary confessions, evidence acquired from unlawful
searches and seizures, evidence acquired in violation of the Miranda
warnings, to cite only a few examples.
Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Committee
on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1969) (statement of Congressman Richard
H. Poff). Of course, as shown above, the jurisprudence for these different areas of
law diverges widely.
176 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
177 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1256 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in
part) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540- 41 (1961)). The Fulminante
Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the admission of involuntary confessions violating core Fifth Amendment values is not per se reversible error. See id. at
1264-66 (adopting harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard). Previously, the
Second Circuit had adopted the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
the context of immunized testimony in United States v. Gallo, 859 F.2d 1078, 108384 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Miron v. United States, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989).
Presumably, Fulminante compels such a result for the other circuits.
178 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.).
179 As noted, the federal immunity statute requires the approval of both the
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some cases, it will be impossible to prevent the dissemination of the
substance of immunized statements. 180 When the prosecutor or
government investigator is exposed to immunized testimony or its
substance, the prosecution is advantaged in many subtle and more
overt ways.
Contact with immunized statements irrevocably alters the
course of events. When an investigator or witness learns of the substance of immunized materials, the effect can never truly be unscrambled from that person's prior untainted knowledge. 18 1 In such
United States Attorney in the district where immunity is granted and a high-ranking
official in the Justice Department before use and derivative use can be granted. 18
U.S.C. § 6003. The procedure's formality undoubtedly is designed to impress
upon the prosecutor that prosecution of the immunized witness may be forfeited by
the choice to immunize.
Self-executing federal immunity statutes, such as the one involved in Hazelwood, appear to be rare. There may be substantial policy justifications for narrowly
crafted, self-executing immunity statutes. Presumably, Congress is capable of
weighing the costs and benefits of such statutes. In any event, it is not the judicial
function to overrule the congressional choice. See Hazelwood v. Alaska, 836 P.2d
943, 953 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) ("adding an exception to the congressional grant
of immunity for cases in which a finding of inevitable discovery could eventually be
made would unquestionably frustrate the congressional purpose of encouraging
prompt notice in all cases").
180 Of course, where the prosecutor, the government investigators and the witnesses are unaware of the immunized statements, there has been no "use" almost
by definition.
181 Whether non-evidentiary use is also constitutionally proscribed is beyond the
scope of this Article. CompareJefferson Keenan, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony and the Increased Likelihood of Conviction, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 173 (1990) (arguing
that non-evidentiary use is prohibited because any advantage conferred on the
prosecution means that the witness's own words have aided the government's case;
recommending per se rule requiring withdrawal of any prosecutor with access to
immunized testimony) with Gary S. Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony:
Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 351, 355 (1987) (stating that if nonevidentiary uses are prohibited, then use and derivative use will become the
equivalent of transactional immunity).
The authors believe that non-evidentiary use can be advantageous to the prosecution in ways that are significant and quite difficult to detect. For example, the
prosecution can gain insight into matters previously known, but not truly understood. See United States v. Tormos-Vega, 656 F. Supp. 1525, 1533 (D.P.R. 1987)
(noting that use of immunized testimony allowed the case agent to "advanc[e] and
gain[] insight into voluminous materials"), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Luis-Boscio, 843 F.2d 1384 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). Trial tactics, including the opening statement, witness preparation, choice of trial witness and crossexamination strategy, can be greatly aided by knowing the defendant's position in
advance of trial. See Keenan, supra, at 186 ("[Al prosecuting attorney with prior
knowledge of the accused's defense clearly possesses an advantage over a prosecutor with precisely the same evidence to present at trial but no prior knowledge of
the defense.").
Investigatory use of immunized materials may also be very difficult to detect,
especially given the reluctance of most courts to grant access to grand jury tran-
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circumstances, there can be no inquiry that is capable of producing
ultimate facts. 1 82 Thus, in the absence of documentary materials
that provide a thorough chronology of an investigation, there is simply no way to challenge an investigator's assertion that the course of
investigation was unaffected by exposure to the immunized
materials.
Likewise, the public dissemination of immunized materials affects witnesses. This result should constitute a prohibited use: "Kastigar is . . . violated whenever the prosecution puts on a witness

whose testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony, regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled testimony."183

Additionally, due to the inevitable discovery exception's hypothetical nature, an inescapable amount of speculation obtains in its
application. Because the inevitable discovery inquiry involves speculative elements, there is a genuine risk of erroneous application in
any given case. The risk of erroneous application is particularly
great where the compelled testimony is strongly incriminating.
Such a witness is not a particularly sympathetic person, especially
when viewed in the post-indictment or post-conviction context. The
emotional temptation to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine
against an already convicted defendant may lead to its injudicious
application: it must be remembered that, after all, hindsight is 20scripts and minutes. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). Moreover, assuming that discovery
is obtained and it can be shown that the investigator had access to immunized
materials, proving use may be quite difficult when the investigator denies such use.
See Leading Cases, supra note 155, at 129-30 ("[T]he exception requires a court to
assess post hoc conjecture by the prosecution, buttressed by police testimony as to
what investigators would have done and would have achieved. Such avowals are
easily made, yet particularly difficult to rebut persuasively."). Indeed, prosecutorial
access to immunized materials can similarly affect the decision to prosecute. In
rejecting the contention that Kastigar proscribed non-evidential use, the Eleventh
Circuit, for example, acknowledged that few prosecutorial decisions could be
shown to be unaffected by access to immunized materials. See United States v.
Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1530 (11 th Cir. 1985).
Such use, however, can usually be avoided by restricting access to grand jury
materials within the prosecutor's office. Casual handling of immunized materials
inevitably results in their use. In short, the non-evidential use of immunized materials may represent an erosion of the Fifth Amendment's protection. Prudential
safeguards and presumptions of use, much like Miranda prophylactic rules, appear
to be necessary to prevent the government from obtaining both subtle and not-sosubtle advantages conferred by the defendant's own coerced words.
182 Jessica Forbes, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the
Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1987) (inevitability finding "is based in many cases on speculation").
183 United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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20.184 Consequently, the availability of the inevitable discovery exception per se may not leave the immunized witness substantially in
the same position as if he had remained silent.
The Supreme Court's rationale for use and derivative use immunity statutes is that the compelled witness can be left in the same
position if a subsequent prosecution proceeds only with independent evidence: "[T]he immunity provided by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 leaves
the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the
same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege
18 5
and suffices to supplant it."'
The independent source rule passes this test because the rule
posits that the evidence against the defendant factually was not affected by his immunized statements. The inevitable discovery exception, however, does not make this claim. Rather, the exception
admits that the immunized statements have been used, but then excuses the usage on a policy-oriented basis. Such core violations cannot be cured with excuses if the Fifth Amendment is to continue to
have meaning.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The choice to immunize a witness is a deliberate act that may
later prevent the government from prosecuting a witness. In
cases where information used by the prosecution is not truly independent of the testimony coerced through a grant of use and
derivative use immunity, the Fifth Amendment's core values are
violated. Upon granting immunity, the government is obligated
to remove all threats of danger of incrimination arising from
truthful immunized testimony. The inevitable discovery doctrine's hypothetical nature creates unjustifiable risks of incrimination to the immunized witness and should not be permitted as a
184 Mark Paul Schnapp, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTPA L. REV. 137, 155 (1976) ("Just as there is a

danger that sophisticated legal argument will be used to show a causal connection
between the initial illegal conduct and the discovery of derivative evidence, the
same 'sophisticated argument' aided by hindsight can be used to show what the
police would have done in a given situation.").
185 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972). The witness is left "in
substantially the same position" provided that the witness's testimony is truthful.
False immunized testimony may subject the witness to a perjury charge in which the
immunized testimony is available to prove perjury. See United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115 (1980) (allowing admission of witness's immunized truthful testimony
before grand jury at witness's later prosecution for false swearing before grand
jury).
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matter of law. The inevitable discovery doctrine should be confined to constitutional rights to which the pragmatism of the exclusionary rule and its deterrent purpose are properly addressed.
Immunized testimony is not such a circumstance.

